As tensions in the Middle East mount, the prospect of U . S . military involvement mdash;particularly against Iranian strategic assets mdash;raises critical questions about policy, deterrence, and the ...

Although hostilities between Pakistan and India have temporarily ceased, strategic analysts widely anticipate the possibility ...

In the early hours of June 1, 2025, Ukraine launched a bold, coordinated drone assault deep into Russian territory, dubbed Operation Spider’s Web. The targets were not tactical vehicles or ...

In Tibet and other border regions, such infrastructure serves a dual role: promoting Beijing’s governance while implicitly threatening to “turn off the tap” or isolate adversaries. 12 Thus, critical ...

This is how the puzzle of escalation squares with de-escalation. My point is rooted in what economics Nobel-laureate Thomas Schelling called a threat that leaves something to chance — make it credible ...

Traditional deterrence theory, developed during the Cold War by thinkers like Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, and Glenn Snyder, presupposed a set of strategic conditions: rational unitary actors, a ...

Thomas Schelling’s theory of “the threat that leaves something to chance” was subtly invoked: India maneuvered just below the threshold of nuclear retaliation, creating ambiguity and stress within ...

In nuclear deterrence theory, ... borrowed from Thomas Schelling’s seminal books entitled The Strategy of Conflict (1960) and Arms and Influence (1966). ...

Revisiting the insights of Thomas Schelling, it becomes clear that deterrence does not rest solely on weapons stockpiles. What matters more is a state’s credibility in its ability to respond and ...

The concept is so slippery that it’s kept strategists busy at least since the American scholar Thomas Schelling (who later won a Nobel Prize for his work in game theory) analyzed types of ...

Game theory research has also shed light on the complexity of these rules of engagement (or non-engagement), such as the expectation (and necessity) of credible retaliation against an attack.

Nuclear theorist Thomas Schelling wrote in 1966 that a “paradox of deterrence is that it does not always help to be, or to be believed to be, fully rational, cool-headed, and in control of ...