Some general requirements for the Quantum Internet are also discussed. The intent of this document is to describe a framework for applications and to describe a few selected …

The idea behind this document is that while a quantum computer can easily reconstruct the shared secret of an (EC)DH exchange, it cannot as easily recover a secret from a symmetric …

This specification defines an alternative way to provide protection against quantum computers, which is similar to the solution defined in RFC 8784, but it also protects the initial IKEv2 SA.

This document, produced by the Quantum Internet Research Group (QIRG), introduces quantum networks and presents general guidelines for the design and construction of such networks.

RFC 9794 Abstract One aspect of the transition to post-quantum algorithms in cryptographic protocols is the development of hybrid schemes that incorporate both post-quantum and …

Each category is defined by a comparatively easy-to-analyze reference primitive that covers a range of security strengths offered by existing NIST standards in symmetric cryptography, …

Many others will fail in interesting ways; we coin the term "Quantum Bug" for such failures. In the following section, we will discuss some examples of Quantum Bugs.

In recent years, cryptographers have been specifying Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) algorithms, including quantum-secure KEM algorithms. This document defines conventions for …

The Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA), as defined by NIST in FIPS 204, is a post-quantum digital signature scheme that aims to be secure against an adversary in …

IKEv1 and its way of using Preshared Keys (PSKs) protects against quantum-computer-based attacks. IKEv2 updated its use of PSKs to improve the error reporting but at the expense of …